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Poetry is the only peace-goddess of the earth and of the angels, who leads 
us, and if only for a matter of hours, out of prisons and onto stars.—Jean 
Paul, Pre-School of Aesthetics [Vorschule der Ästhetik] (1804) 1
in his treatise on poetics and aesthetics, Jean Paul personifies 
poetry as an angel that frees “us” readers—and writers—from 
confinement. As definitive as the theme of interiority is for the 
Romantic period as a whole, in Jean Paul’s fictions the transi-
tion between inner and outer spaces is of pervasive significance 
both thematically and formally. Attention to these transitions 
offers a clue to a riddle otherwise posed by Jean Paul’s texts: the 
thematic emphasis on the inner life can seem strangely at odds 
with the externality of their form, a predominantly authorial 
dis course relying mainly on a nexus of metaphors rather than 
the modulation of the narrative voice. Doubtless this tension 
relates to the situation of writing in a period in which the idea 
of an indispensible inner core to the human individual no longer 
enjoys unchallenged metaphysical support. Wolfgang Pross lo-
cates Jean Paul’s writing at the crossroads between “metaphysical 
1  Jean Paul, Vorschule der Ästhetik (1804), in Werke, ed. Norbert Miller, 6 vols. 
(Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1960-63), 5:35. References to Jean Paul’s 
writings are to this edition; translations are my own. [Die Poesie] ist die 
einzige Friedengöttin der Erde und der Engel, der uns, und wär es nur auf 
Stunden, aus Kerkern auf Sterne führt.
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need and historical awareness.”2 The following analysis aims 
to pinpoint more closely the source of this tension as well as 
one of Jean Paul’s strategies for working through it, by focusing 
on a recurrent motif that binds together themes central to the 
discourse of Romanticism—interiority, transcendence, educa-
tion, and confession—namely the motif of emergence.
Jean Paul’s scenes of emergence reflect the problematic 
status of an interiority that has come to be seen as a product 
of historical development rather than as metaphysically given. 
Accordingly, Jean Paul’s first narrative of education, in his early 
novel The Invisible Lodge [Die Unsichtbare Loge] (1792), considers 
the paradoxical case of inwardness cultivated from the outside. 
His definition of poetic genius in the Pre-School of Aesthetics 
concedes the ambivalence of the inner life as a harbinger of either 
transcendence or death, and consequently as something that both 
beautifies life and potentially deceives as to life’s true nature.3 His 
philosophical anticipation of immortality in the late work Selina 
(1823–25) is inseparable from both his reliance on analogy as a 
guide to thought and his understanding of the soul as a process 
of continual emergence. Both the notion of thought as a structure 
of comparison and the motif of the inner life unfolding as from a 
cocoon are latent in Jean Paul’s most significant precursor, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, with the later writer even borrowing part of 
Rousseau’s first name to use in his pseudonym.
In Rousseau’s description of the emergent “facultés virtuelles” 
of the mind in Émile (1762), a paradigm is set for a tension 
present throughout his writing.4 Rousseau defines the inner life 
as a widening gap between imagination and fulfillment, linking 
imagination ineluctably with desire, and immediately sets about 
attempting to contain this gap. The plot of education in Émile, 
in which the tutor and narrator guides his pupil’s development 
2  Wolfgang Pross, Jean Pauls geschichtliche Stellung (Frankfurt: Niemayer 
Verlag, 1975), 72. The tension here described as inherent in the intellectual 
climate of the late eighteenth century is one between “historischem 
Bewusstsein und metaphysischem Bedürfnis.”
3  The title Vorschule der Ästhetik, while emphasizing the preliminary nature of 
its own endeavour, does not have quite the diminutive connotations of this 
English translation.
4  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, ou de l ’éducation (1762), in Œuvres complètes, 
ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 
4:304. References to Rousseau’s writings are to this edition.
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by awakening and restraining his imagination, displaces onto 
the interaction between tutor and pupil the basic problem of 
the inner life as the narrator has earlier defined it. Jean Paul 
effectively reframes the relationship between tutor and pupil as 
one between writer and reader across the rhetorical and narrative 
surface of the text. 
In doing so, Jean Paul replicates, in the metaphorical structure 
of his own text, the temporal structure foreseen by Rousseau in 
his discussion of emergent “imagination,” and revises the notion 
of “happiness” that Rousseau’s account had placed off lim its. 
Happiness, which by Rousseau’s definition becomes in acces-
sible upon the emergence of a significant interiority, is redefined 
programmatically in Jean Paul to comprise the ex change of 
perspectives and shifts in and out that also comprise the nar-
ra tive and rhetorical style of his texts. When seen against the 
background of Rousseau’s philosophical fiction, episodes in Jean 
Paul’s novels that emphasize the performative nature of revela-
tions of interiority can be seen as part of an ambivalent defence 
of this mode of performance against Rousseau’s critique. This 
defence, not carried out theoretically so much as in and through 
the fictional texts themselves, recognizes the theoretical validity 
of Rousseau’s insights, and thus limits itself to the notion that 
the poetic imagination and its constructions of interiority can 
make one “not happy, but happier,” conceding that on occasion 
the enterprise can also backfire. 
In the opening of The Invisible Lodge, the narrator engages his 
characters and reader in a complex game commenting on the 
nature of education, transcendence and interiority. The novel’s 
protagonist Gustav spends his first eight conscious years in an 
underground cellar with his tutor. Following a cue from the nar-
rator describing Gustav’s “Platons-Höhle,” this scheme designed 
by Gustav’s parents has been read in various ways as a revision of 
the cave allegory in Plato’s Republic.5 The young Gustav’s future 
grandmother, a pietist, will allow her daughter to marry Gustav’s 
future father on the condition that the new couple’s first-born 
5  See Herbert Kaiser, Jean Paul lesen: Versuch über seine poetische Anthropologie 
des Ich (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1995); Paul Fleming, 
The Pleasures of Abandonment: Jean Paul and the Life of Humour (Würzbirg: 
Königshausen und Neumann, 2005), 39–40; and my subsequent remarks on 
these two readings. 
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child be raised according to a curious experiment. The child is to 
live until the age of eight with a tutor selected from the nearby 
Barby pietist community in an underground chamber, which is 
all that remains of a monastic ruin on the family estate of his 
father, who, the narrator tells us, has long regretted not having it 
sealed up (1:54). The suggestion is that Gustav’s cave represents 
a submerged origin. 
Gustav’s tutor tells him that the underground cellar is the 
earth and that the surface of earth is heaven; he will ascend to the 
surface once he has proven himself virtuous, and his emergence 
will be a resurrection. The narrator hints that the childhood 
equation of “death” with the delightful experience of emergence 
will remain in Gustav’s memory, the way a toy with which a child’s 
virtue is rewarded sweetens good deeds even once it is no longer 
offered, and that this memory will even sweeten the expectation 
of actual death: “He tricked out the semblance of death, to the 
advantage of real death, with every charm, and one day Gustav 
will die much more enchanted than one of us” (1:60).6 Gustav’s 
training conditions him to love both life and death; he learns to 
walk upright on the basis of a deceptive plot.
Gustav’s awaited emergence from the cave occasions in the 
narrator general anxieties about human destiny. The narrator 
forgoes the omniscient, outside status we might expect of him 
were he not writing in the register of sensibility. Gustav appears as 
a paradigm of human entry into a perilous world, one that reflects 
onto the existences of the narrator and his readers: “But since he 
then came to see nature face to face, so it is not his fate alone, 
but mine and that of others, that weighs on me, since I consider, 
through how much mud our teachers must drag our inner man, 
like a criminal, before he can stand upright” (1:61).7 The narrator 
interprets Gustav’s underground education as a paradigmatic 
preparation of an “inner man” to face an outer world, only by 
another method than that applied by more terrestrial schemes 
6  Er schmückte den scheinbaren Tod zum Vorteile des wahren mit allen Reizen 
aus, und Gustav stirbt einmal entzückter als einer von uns.
7  Aber da er alsdann auch der großen Natur ins Angesicht schauen darf: 
so ists doch nicht sein Schicksal allein, was mich beklommen macht, 
sondern meines und fremdes, weil ich bedenke, durch wieviel Kot unsere 
Lehrer unsern innern Menschen wie einen Missetäter schleifen, eh‘ er sich 
aufrichten darf!
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of education.8 Despite or rather because of its subterranean 
peculiarity, Gustav’s training and emergence becomes a type for 
the notion of “education” in general. 
What is most curious about this passage, though, is what 
passes almost unnoticed: the narrator’s agreement with 
Gustav’s parents on the “inwardness” of his education. The 
narrator even opens the episode with this symbolic translation 
of the spatial order of Gustav’s upbringing in the underground 
enclosure: “Since education changes much less on the inner 
man and much more on the outer one than courtiers imagine, 
one will wonder at how with Gustav the opposite was the case, 
for his whole life sounded after the keynote of his celestial, 
that is, his subterranean education” (1:53).9 The narrator 
links the humorously paradoxical unity of the “celestial” and 
“subterranean” to the “interior,” as opposed to a merely external 
world in between. Jean Paul’s “theatre of human suffering and 
action” as he later calls the world above ground,10 differs from 
the German baroque theatre to which it has sometimes been 
compared (1:60).11 Whereas the baroque theatre represented 
heaven above and hell immediately below the stage, in Jean 
Paul’s fictional theatre the dubious ancient opening in the family 
ground is metaphorically a doorway both to the underworld and 
to heaven. The narrator affectionately calls Gustav a “nursling 
of the grave” (1:57). With the double meanings inherent to 
metaphor Jean Paul concedes that the door inward leads both up 
and down.12 Earthly life is less a stage poised between opposing 
 8  Gerd Ueding notes that the choice to educate Gustav’s “inner” rather than 
“outer man” reflects a “pietistic radicalization of a motif from Rousseau,” 
aiming to oppose Gustav to the prevailing values of society rather than 
train him in the same. Ueding, “Episches Atemholen—über Jean Pauls 
widerspenstiges Erzählen,” Jean Paul-Jahrbuch 1994 (Verlag: Hermann 
Böhlaus Nachfolger, Weimar, 1994), 67.
 9  Da Erziehung weit weniger am innern Menschen (und weit mehr am äußern) 
ändern kann, als Hofmeister sich einbilden: so wird man sich wundern, daß 
bei Gustav gerade das Gegenteil eintrat; denn sein ganzes Leben klang nach 
dem Chorton seiner überirdischen, d.h. unterirdischen Erziehung.
10 Theater des menschlichen Leidens und Tuns.
11  Most famously by Walter Benjamin, for whom Jean Paul is “the greatest 
allegorist among the German poets (Poeten).” Benjamin, Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978), 166.
12  Gustav’s first gaze upward further bears out this doubleness: “als sein 
wieder aufwärts geworfnes Auge in dem tiefen Himmel, der Öffnung der 
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metaphysical forces than a house with an inner chamber, whose 
threshold beckons to origins or to ends. It is the status of this 
inner life itself that is in question in these narratives. 
Gustav’s tutor arranges for a French horn to play from outside 
the cellar just as he is preparing to let Gustav out into the world. 
The horn’s sound brings to musical life the threnody whose lyrics 
the tutor had taught Gustav to read on the page. Participation in 
the song is the final step along Gustav’s initiation before he can 
ascend to earth and join the family of men he has heard described 
as angels. Just as Gustav begins to believe that his heart “was 
dying of the notes,” the narrator inserts an encomium to music: 
“Music! Echo of a distant and more harmonious world! Sigh of 
the angel in us! When words are speechless, and eyes, even when 
weeping, and our mute hearts are alone behind the bars of the 
breast, so it is you through whom they call to each other in their 
prisons and unite their sighs in the desert!” (1:60).13 Not only is 
music a form of immediacy capable of bridging the gap between 
the enclosed inner worlds of different people, which even the 
natural signs of the body cannot bridge—but also this immediacy 
echoes another world where inside and outside are not in conflict 
as they are here. Music reaches us from a world outside our own 
where the block of eyes, bodies and hearts no longer hinders our 
speech. In the realm of the angels the harmonic relationships 
expressed in music are all in all, as the irreducibly contingent 
facts of bodies, hearts and eyes vanish. Ironically, the narrator’s 
transcendent claims on behalf of music echo those of the tutor 
in this final step of his education of Gustav. The communion 
of feeling evoked by Jean Paul’s “sensible” narration is itself a 
performative echo of that metaphysical harmony allegedly native 
to the distant world of the angels.
What the novel is to us, Gustav’s cave is to the novel: a world 
of play, in which we suspend our disbelief in order to reap the 
aesthetic benefit of its substitutions. The narrator mobilizes the 
Unendlichkeit, versank“ (1:63). While Gustav’s underground education was 
celestial, heaven is conversely described as a cave.
13  O Musik! Nachklang aus einer entlegnen harmonischen Welt! Seufzer 
des Engels in uns! Wenn das Wort sprachlos ist, und die Umarmung, und 
das Auge, und das weinende, und wenn unsre stummen Herzen hinter 
dem Brust-Gitter einsam liegen: o so bist nur du es, durch welche sie sich 
einander zurufen in ihren Kerkern und ihre entfernten Seufzer vereinigen 
in ihrer Wüste!
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reader’s desire for transcendence—and for music, in a rhythmical 
prose that imitates it—just as the tutor mobilizes this desire in 
Gustav. This redoubling of the content of the narrative onto the 
narratorial voice itself is ironic, insofar as we know that the tutor’s 
scheme for Gustav’s “resurrection” is a game—that it is fictitious. 
What is more, this fiction of transcendence frames not only the 
scene in the cave, but the novel as a whole. When Gustav’s tutor 
exits the cave and the novel, he leaves behind half of a musical 
harmony which is cited at the end of the novel, and whose other 
half neither Gustav, the reader nor the narrator knows.
The fantasy of completion suggested by the unfinished song 
echoes the prologue to the novel in the 1825 edition of the 
Complete Works, the last Complete Works edition published in 
Jean Paul’s lifetime (the 1960 Werke edition includes the 1825 
prologue). In this prologue, the author provides a retrospective 
look at his first novel, calling it a “born ruin” (1:13).14 This novel 
occasions a defence of the fragment as that form most reflective 
of the unfinished form of any human life: “And what life in the 
world do we not see interrupted? ... so let us console ourselves 
by saying that man sees only knots in the present surroundings, 
and only after the grave will we find their denouements” (1:13).15 
Just like Gustav, we readers are left only with a dissonant music 
at the end of Die Unsichtbare Loge, and would need a sequel for 
its resolution. The narrator carefully orchestrates the scene and 
the novel to put the reader in the place of Gustav. What the 
tutor promises Gustav outside the cave, the narrator promises 
the reader outside the confines of the novel. Reading and 
writing is a way of playing at transcendence.16 The emergence 
14  Ungeachtet meiner Aussichten und Versprechungen bleibt sie doch eine 
geborne Ruine [in spite of my plans and promises, (the Loge) shall remain 
a born ruin].
15  Welches Leben in der Welt sehen wir denn nicht unterbrochen? ... so tröste 
man sich damit, daß der Mensch rund herum in seiner Gegenwart nichts 
sieht als Knoten,—und erst hinter seinem Grabe liegen die Auflösungen.
16  The opposing ways in which recent critics understand Gustav’s emergence 
from the cave provide a case study in how disputes in the analysis of 
Roman ticism sometimes boil down to the choice of one or another term 
in a polarity. Interpretations of Gustav’s emergence from the cave that 
emphasize the delight he experiences in the substitution of earth for 
heaven, as does Paul Fleming’s, seem to me to capture with perfect clarity 
half of the double movement of Jean Paul’s text (Fleming, 39–40). Herbert 
Kaiser, on the other hand, sees the parallel between the tutor or Genius as 
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into the transcendent that the student Friedrich Richter may 
have sought in theology or Leibniz is for the novelist Jean Paul 
embodied wholly in the practice of fiction. As we have seen 
in Gustav’s tutor’s play at resurrection, this emergence has its 
obverse face of deception.
The closing reflection on “genius” in the Vorschule der Ästhetik 
echoes the double nature of the Genius’s education of Gustav, 
teaching him to love both life and death. By using the word 
Genius in this passage rather than Genie, Jean Paul signals 
a proximity to the sense of “genius” as a daimon or attendant 
personal spirit that also underlies the title given by the narrator 
of The Invisible Lodge to Gustav’s tutor: “But when genius leads 
us over the battlefields of life, then we look with such free-
dom beyond them, as if fame or the love of country went out 
be fore us with flags fluttering back; and in its company need 
(die Not) gains an Arcadian form, as before a pair of lovers” 
(5:67).17 Jean Paul leaves open the question of whether genius 
merely beautifies a destitute reality or rather reveals some tran-
scendent sense within it. His prose moves suggestively from 
one metaphor to another: “Everywhere genius makes life free 
and death beautiful; on a sphere we see, as on the sea, the sail 
that carries the ship earlier than the heavy ship itself ” (5:67).18 
Genius works through a kind of synecdoche, revealing the guid-
ing sail of life before the ship of death that is its base appears, 
there by enhancing both life and death. The ensuing passage 
associ ates “life” and “death” with “helpless life” and “ethereal 
sense,” the latter in accord with the edifying power of death in 
the Christian tradition: “In this way it reconciles, even betroths—
as do love and youth—helpless life with the ethereal sense, just 
as on the shore of a still water the outer tree and the reflected 
the narrator calls him, and a larger Genius governing the world of the novel 
as a whole. Kaiser takes this equation as a direct theological statement, 
missing the possibility of an ironic design in the parallel between cave 
and cosmos (Kaiser, 24–35). Both critics see in Gustav’s cave a structural 
emblem of the “life of humour” without considering the medium of the 
narrative voice as constitutive of meaning.
17  Wenn hingegen der Genius uns über die Schlachtfelder des Lebens führt: 
so sehen wir so frei hinüber, als wenn der Ruhm oder die Vaterlandsliebe 
vorausginge mit den zurückflatternden Fahnen; und neben ihm gewinnt die 
Dürftigkeit wie vor einem Paar Liebenden eine arkadische Gestalt.
18   Überall macht er das Leben frei und den Tod schön; auf seiner Kugel sehen 
wir, wie auf dem Meer, die tragenden Segel früher als das schwere Schiff.
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one seem to extend from one root to two heavens” (5:67).19 The 
genius enhances both life and death for mortal consciousness, 
as if they were a tree and its reflection on the water’s surface, 
striv ing from one root towards opposite heavens.
Thus the narrator of the Vorschule der Ästhetik compares the 
relationship of “life” and “death” presented by genius to a rela-
tionship of reflection whereby one of the two terms—and it is 
not entirely clear which—is the scientifically “real” one while 
the other takes the place of its reflection. Notice also that the 
tree above the water-line is the “outer” tree. If we line up this 
“outer tree” with “helpless life,” then the “ethereal sense” or death 
becomes our inner reality. Rooted in us is an ethereal sense which 
is one metaphorical step away from the death we also carry in us. 
Genial poetry makes this inner reflection appear just as real as 
the indisputable outer reality, and for this act of mirroring Jean 
Paul praises it. While Jean Paul accepts the possibility that the 
inner sense we carry in us is nothing other than death, he does 
not allow this possibility to overshadow the equally plausible one 
that it is transcendent. A notion of interiority characteristic of 
pietism on the one hand, and on the other hand one that will 
come into its own in Rilke and Heidegger, duel for mastery in 
Jean Paul’s poetic worldview.
In his late work Selina (1825), Jean Paul presents two alternate 
possibilities for the fate of the soul after death in the form of 
an interpretation of the metaphor behind the word “psyche,” 
in which the ancient Greeks compared the inner life force to a 
butterfly: “In the ancient comparison of the development of a 
butterfly with that of the psyche are more truths than we realize, 
for in the larva instinct finds already the blueprint for the future 
that it will have to work out, as sacred instinct does in the human” 
(6:1211).20 Thus Jean Paul begins by comparing the presence of 
“instinct” in the larva to that of “sacred instinct” or potentiality 
in the human frame, as both work out a “blueprint of the future” 
19  Auf diese Weise versöhnet, ja vermählt er—wie die Liebe und die Jugend—
das unbehülfliche Leben mit dem ätherischen Sinn, so wie am Ufer eines 
stillen Wassers der äußere und der abgespiegelte Baum aus einer Wurzel 
nach zwei Himmeln zu wachsen scheinen.
20  In der uralten Vergleichung der Entwicklungen des Schmetterlings und der 
Psyche wohnen mehr Wahrheiten als man darin sucht; denn in der Raupe 
findet der Instinkt schon den Bauriß der Zukunft, den es auszuarbeiten 
haben [wird] wie im Menschen der heilige.
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that will lead to development.21 Following this basic analogy is a 
physical description of the larva that leaves implicit the analogy 
to the parallel structure of an inner life growing within the 
body: “in the larva is already, according to Swammerdam, the 
cocoon prepared, and this encloses the butterfly in turn, with its 
folded wings and antennae” (6:1211).22 This account of a physical 
structure certified by scientific authority strengthens the parallel 
to the emergence of the soul by leaving the other side of the 
analogy implicit. By visualizing the natural development of the 
butterfly in such concrete detail, the text works subtly to persuade 
the reader of a parallel process at work in the inner life, more 
than it literally makes that process visible.
This rhetorical strategy borrows credit from the original 
metaphorical perception underlying the word “psyche,” where by 
the ancient Greeks perceived a similarity between the butterfly 
and that inner life force which is within the human without 
being identical to his body. That this strategy is rhetorical, and not 
mere ly heuristic, comes to the surface at the close of the passage, 
when Jean Paul finds himself compelled to ask the reader to choose 
between competing interpretations of the butterfly metaphor. 
The question first arises once the moment of death appears as the 
final horizon for the comparison of butterfly and psyche: “how 
these similarities speak to the wishes of our psyche! Just like the 
butterfly in the cocoon, how it wants to shed its drop of blood 
to escape and spread its wings” (6:1211).23 Even within the space 
21  The notion of a god-ward pull in the human individual as analogous to 
animal “instinct” goes back to J.G. Herder. In his essay “Vom Erkennen und 
Empfinden der menschlichen Seele,” Herder identifies a mode of experience 
that anticipates its objects: “it is a new divinatory drive that promises us 
pleasure in an obscure intimation, leaps over space and time and gives us a 
foretaste of the future. Perhaps it is so with the instinct of animals” [es ist ein 
neuer weissagender Trieb, der uns Genuß zusagt, dunkel ihn ahnden läßt, 
Raum und Zeit überspringet und uns Vorgeschmack gibt in die Zukunft. 
Vielleicht ists also mit dem Instinkt der Tiere]. Herder, Werke, ed. Wolfgang 
Pross, vol. 1 (München: Hanser, 1984), 345. See also Vorschule der Ästhetik, 
where Jean Paul identifies “man’s instinct or drive” as the “sense for the future” 
and calls it “this transcendent angel of the inner life” [diesen überirdischen 
Engel des innern Lebens] (5:60–61).
22  Schon in der Raupe liegt nach Swammerdam die Puppe vorbereitet und 
diese schließt wieder den Schmetterling mit seinen zusammengelegten 
Flügeln und Fühlhörnern ein.
23  Wie sprechen diese Ähnlichkeiten die Wünsche unserer Psyche an—wie 
er unter seiner Entpuppung will sie gern ihren Tropfen Blut vergießen, um 
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of credibility allowed by analogical thinking, Jean Paul cannot 
get around the existence of a disturbing alternative outcome, 
which is no less probable than that of the soul’s emergence into 
a transcendent afterlife. This alternative he attempts to ward off 
through encasing it in a rhetorical question: “[wouldn’t it be] 
too hard and contradictory, if after all the shedding of coils, the 
shrinking under the brittle mantel of old age, nothing emerged 
from, or remained within, the barely living cocoon but a rotten 
butterfly in its pendant tomb?” (6:1211).24 Since analogy alone 
cannot decide the question, Jean Paul calls on “the wishes of our 
psyche” to adjudicate between eternal life and death (6:1211).
Significant in Jean Paul’s depiction of the psyche or soul as 
butterfly is the emphasis he places on emergent structures 
concealed within the immature larva. The soul would seem to 
have to develop after death because its namesake in nature, the 
psyche or butterfly, is a structure concealing smaller structures 
about to emerge. The immortality of the soul is a logical con-
clusion—that is, one in accordance with the analogical suggestions 
of language—not because of the soul’s immutability but rather 
because of its structure as becoming. Once limits are set to the 
soul’s continual process of emergence, implicitly its very existence 
is called into question. 
By positing infinite perfectibility as the content of the inner 
life, Jean Paul has not moved far from Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
The paradoxes latent in Rousseau’s writing came to define the 
ethical discourse on interiority in his period just as strongly as 
Kant’s logical construction of the “inner sense” in the Critique 
of Pure Reason sets the terms for the ontological discussion. 
Though in his autobiographical writings Rousseau often 
describes his inner space as a place of retreat from the external 
world, most famously in the Rêveries where in a moment of 
complete self-enclosure, in a boat on the lake, his consciousness 
is reduced to “le seul sentiment de l’existence” (1:1047), it is a 
con sequence of Rousseau’s anthropological thought that the 
inner sense is not an irreducible essence so much as an artifact 
entpuppt zu werden und auf einmal die schlaffen Flügel weit und straff 
auszuspannen.
24  [Wär‘ es nicht] gar zu hart und widersprechend, wenn nun nach allem 
schmerzhaften Hautabsprengen, engen Einwindeln, und Greisen-Erstarren 
in eine kaum rege Puppe zuletzt nichts herauskäme oder eigentlich nichts 
darin bliebe als ein verfaulter Schmetterling im hangenden Puppensarg?
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of history. The moment when interiority enters the world runs 
like a fault line through Rousseau’s work, appearing in various 
forms in different contexts. One of its manifestations concerns 
the emergence of what Rousseau calls “les facultés virtuelles,” the 
chief among them “l’imagination” (4:304).
The rhetoric of interiority in Rousseau tends to obscure 
that, for Rousseau, the inner symbolic space of consciousness 
is not original but rather emerges over time. Though he does 
not say so explicitly, the humanity he depicts in the state of 
nature barely has any recognizable interiority at all. Though 
he counsels: “O homme, resserre ton existence au dedans de 
toi, et tu ne seras plus miserable” (4:308), it is not clear what 
is inside man besides those virtual faculties, placed “en réserve 
au fond de son âme” (4:304). With the emergence of this inner 
sense man first gains knowledge of both temporal succession 
and death, of which children and animals are not aware.25 It is 
difficult to imagine an inner life in which we are not already 
exiled from ourselves, as we are when we consider the future, as 
Rousseau writes in an apostrophe to foresight: “La prévoyance! 
La prévoyance qui nous porte sans cesse au delà de nous et 
souvent nous place ou nous n’arriverons point” (4:307). In his 
later Rêveries, Rousseau repeats that foresight and imagination 
are at the root of unhappiness (1:1080).
Rousseau’s definition of happiness is a ratio of balance: “Un 
être sensible dont les facultés égaleroit les désirs seroit un être 
absolument heureux” (4:307). While this equilibrium is in 
man’s nature, that nature conceals within itself a force waiting 
to emerge and disrupt it:
Elle ne lui donne immédiatement que les désirs nécessaires à sa 
conservation, et les facultés suffisantes pour les satisfaire. Elle a 
mis toutes les autres comme en réserve au fond de son âme pour 
s’y dévéloper a besoin. Ce n’est que dans cet état primitif que 
l’équilibre du pouvoir et du désir se rencontre et que l’homme n’est 
pas malheureux. Sitôt que ses facultés virtuelles se mettent en action 
l’imagination, la plus active de toutes, s’éveille et les devance. C’est 
l’imagination qui étend pour nous la mesure des possibles soit en 
25  In the Discours sur l ’origine de l ’inégalité, Rousseau writes: “jamais l’animal ne 
saura ce que c’est que mourir, et la connaissance de la mort, et de ses terreurs, 
est une des premières acquisitions que l’homme ait faites, en s’éloignant de la 
condition animale.” On the next page, he describes natural man: “Son âme, 
que rien n’agite, se livre au seul sentiment de son existence actuelle, sans 
aucune idée de l’avenir” (3:143–44).
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bien soit en mal, et qui par conséquent excite et nourrit les désirs 
par l’espoir de les satisfaire. Mais l’objet qui paroissoit d’abord sous 
la main fuit plus vîte qu’on ne peut le poursuivre; quand on croit 
l’atteindre il se transforme et se montre loin devant nous. Ne voyant 
plus le pays déjà parcouru nous le comptons pour rien; celui qui 
reste à parcourir s’aggrandit, s’étend sans cesse; ainsi l’on s’épuise 
sans arriver au terme et plus nous gagnons sur la jouissance, plus le 
bonheur s’ éloigne de nous. (4:304)
The imagination is a structure of comparison through which 
desire can realize its infinite nature, always transcending finite 
givens.26 The same governor of Émile who, as Rousseau’s narra-
tor, delivers this narrative of the emergence from happiness into 
the unhappiness of comparison and desire returns to the theme 
in his assertion to his young pupil that one must be happy.27 
His view of happiness is one of self-enclosure, as he instructs 
Émile: “Sois homme; retire ton cœur dans les bornes de ta condi-
tion,” continuing, “Étudie et connois ces bornes; quelque étroites 
qu’elles soient, on n’est point malheureux tant qu’on s’y renferme; 
on ne l’est que quand on veut les passer ... On l’est quand on 
oublie son état d’homme pour s’en forger d’imaginaires desquels 
on retombe toujours dans le sien” (4:819). The nature of Émile’s 
unhappiness is less remarkable, given Rousseau’s stoic penchant, 
than its immediate cause: he has fallen in love with Sophie, a 
young woman the two have encountered during an overnight 
stay at a farmhouse, and whose appeal for the young man is in no 
small part due to his teacher. 
Earlier in the plot, the governor, having kept his charge in 
relative solitude for much of his life, considers a suitable way to 
introduce Émile to society. Rather than allowing Émile to ex-
perience the world on his own, the governor chooses a focused 
approach that originates in his own imagination. The tutor 
26  In pointing out paradoxical implications of the emergence of imagination 
from nature, my reading is structurally in agreement with Jacques Derrida, 
De la grammatologie (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 264ff.
27  A corollary to Rousseau’s emphasis on the happy state as a bounded one is 
the necessity of the bounds of mortality: “Si nous étions immortels nous 
serions des êtres très misérables. Il est dur de mourir, sans doute; mais il est 
doux d’espérer qu’on ne vivra pas toujours, et qu’une meilleure vie finira les 
peines de celle-ci” (4:305). Rousseau’s wish for immortality contrasts with 
Jean Paul’s in that Rousseau emphasizes the promise of something different 
from this life, while Jean Paul wishes the continuation of the process of 
emergence that defines the present inner life.
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invites his pupil to join him in imagining the traits and charms 
of his future mate, in order to prepare Émile to fall in love with 
the right woman when the time comes. Since the tutor cannot 
avoid this moment in his pupil’s life, he chooses to anticipate 
it, to modulate it in advance to fit his pedagogical aims.
In reflecting on his chosen method of conjuring a charming 
and lovable partner for Émile as a first introduction to broader 
human society, the governor alludes to his earlier reflection 
on comparisons springing from desire and imagination as the 
seductive source of societal ill: “Il n’importe que l’objet que je 
lui peindrai soit imaginaire; ... il suffit qu’il trouve par tout des 
comparaisons qui lui fassent préférer sa chimère aux objets réels 
qui le frapperont, et qu’est-ce-que le véritable amour lui-même, 
si ce n’est chimère, mensonge, illusion?” (4:656). The tutor aims 
to “rend[re] [Émile] d’avance passionné sans savoir de qui,” giving 
him an imaginary object that will sour him to any alternatives 
he may later encounter in the course of his experience (4:656). 
By furnishing the imaginary object himself, the tutor-narrator 
plans to set the terms of the inevitable comparisons that arise 
in Émile’s mind between real and desired objects; as “maître 
des comparaisons,” he promises to contain the process of 
imagination that for paradigmatic “man,” on his exit from 
“nature,” proved uncontainable (4:656).
In the scene of its emergence in book 2, the imagination gives 
rise to comparisons between desired objects and those already 
possessed; now the comparisons are between real and unreal ob-
jects. The inability of the imagining mind to be satisfied with 
what is at hand gives rise to the structure of comparison and 
to the making of illusions. One of these illusions is true love, 
through which the tutor plans to trap his pupil for his own good.
The governor’s plan employs both imagination and anticipa-
tion. His strategy aims at making Émile divine an original behind 
the image: “Je ne veux pas non plus qu’on lui mente en affirmant 
faussement que l’objet qu’on lui peint existe; mais s’il se complaît 
à l’image, il lui souhaitera bientôt un original” (4:656). While 
the tutor maintains a nice distinction between the imaginary 
and the real, he nevertheless uses seductive devices to close the 
gap between the two, culminating in the talisman of the name. 
In the interest of giving “à cet objet imaginaire un plus grand 
air de vérité,” the governor names her in an ostensibly off-hand 
way: “je dirois en riant: appelons Sophie votre future maîtresse: 
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Sophie est un nom de bon augure.” The tutor reasons that, since 
even if the woman his pupil chooses does not bear this name, 
“elle sera digne au moins de le porter; nous pouvons lui en faire 
l’honneur d’avance” (4:657).
The tutor’s plans work well, once Émile meets a Sophie 
later in the book and promptly falls in love, murmur ing her 
name in astonishment. Fiction anticipates reality in Émile’s life 
and has a hand in bringing it into being. The inevitability of 
imagination and its comparisons necessitates fiction in the plot 
of education. Rousseau extends this logic when, in the preface 
to La Nouvelle Héloïse, he apologizes: “il faut des spectacles 
dans les grandes villes, et des romans aux peuples corrompus” 
(2:6). While the imagination is a necessary component of 
the moral life, as it oversees the distribution of sympathy, the 
deleterious effects of its emergence into the world are not to be 
forgotten. The denigration of the novel was a common theme 
in the Enlightenment, and yet Rousseau lived its paradox with 
a special intensity.
That fictional plotting is necessary to an educational scheme 
has already become apparent in a first glance at The Invisible 
Lodge. Jean Paul extends the self-reflective fictionality of his novel 
of education, however, beyond the scope of education, implying 
that fictionality is an unavoidable dimension of the inner life. 
Not only promised transcendence, but other realms of innermost 
experience turn out not to be far enough away from fiction in 
their own structure to be able to foreswear it honestly. In Jean 
Paul’s early novels of education, play and masking take on their 
most elaborate forms where one might most expect to find an 
instance of shared interiority, in love. 
At a window of the palace Gustav and Beata stand together. 
Looking out the window they become aware of the need not 
to be too openly attached: “Need forced them both to bring 
an external object between their souls as they began to flow 
into each other,” so they fasten on a boy and girl playing in 
the courtyard (1:266–67).28 Soon these children turn out to be 
playing Gustav and Beata and exchanging love vows, promising 
each other the gardens, palace and everything around them. 
28  Die Not zwang beide, jetzt einen äußern Gegenstand ... zwischen ihren 
zusammenfließenden Seelen zu bringen.
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“That was too much for the front-loge above” (1:267),29 the 
narrator comments, introducing another moment of sensibility. 
The play the lovers are watching from the loge puts them on 
stage. Could the same be said of the reader, watching the actions 
on this novelistic stage from the comfort of his invisible loge? 
The children sought and found by Gustav and Beata are the 
third desired by the lovers to deflect and preserve their love. 
While this third should be an object of the lovers’ gaze capable 
of dividing it and thus saving them from the social dangers of 
union, it becomes instead a subject that gazes through them at 
the ultimate gazer, the reader. Not only is the mimicry of the 
external social world already implicated in the lovers’ merger of 
souls, but the reader’s experience of the fictional play of the text 
is as well, since what we see in Gustav and Beata, they in turn see 
in the children. In the attempt to protect their innermost selves 
from the world’s gaze, Gustav and Beata expose themselves to 
the reflection that their inwardness is a form of fictional play.
Love is put on stage in a climactic sequence of Titan (1800–
3), leading to the death of one of the elliptical novel’s two focal 
protagonists. Titan is an ellipse with Albano and Roquairol at its 
focal points. Albano’s name, with its associations of whiteness, 
hints that he is the Candide of the novel, an innocent whose 
moral development is hardly sufficient for the energies that go 
into making the novel of education. Roquairol’s dandyish mis-
education is foregrounded in the outlandish rhetorical style of 
his letters and stage performances, in which he alone among the 
major characters seems to be trying to outdo the narrator in his 
use of metaphor to evoke pathos. When Roquairol shoots himself 
on stage as a tribute to his unrequited love for a woman playing 
the role of his beloved in his play, entitled The Tragedian,30 he 
would seem to be a parody of Werther were it not for the hint 
at the theatrical aspect of Werther’s own clumsy suicide. As an 
avatar of inwardness, Roquairol could not have chosen a better 
precursor than Werther, who writes to Wilhelm early in the 
novel Die Leiden des jungen Werther (1774), “I go into myself and 
find a world.”31
29 Das war zu viel für die Frontloge oben.
30  Or perhaps more accurately The Mourning-Player (Der Trauerspieler).
31  Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Die Leiden des jungen Werther (1774), in Werke 
(Berlin: Aufbau, 1979), Am 22 Mai [Ich kehre in mich selbst zurück 
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The narrator ambivalently traces Roquairol’s perversity to 
his unrequited early love and to a penchant for anticipating 
experience in fictional performances. Though the narrator will 
soon relate that “the unhappy love for Linda de Romeiro, which 
later might have steeled him, opened so early all the veins of his 
heart and bathed it warm in its own blood,” first he describes 
Roquairol’s mode of “anticipating sensations” in a way that fixes 
this characteristic as something constant: “all motions into 
which love, friendship and nature lift the heart ... he traversed 
in poems earlier than in life, as an actor and playwright before 
experiencing them as a man ... thus when they finally appeared 
live in his breast, he could sensibly grasp, govern, kill and stuff 
them for the ice-chest of future memory” (3:263).32 After 
this description of the programmatic primacy of art to life in 
Roquairol’s character, the narrator’s report of his early love for 
Linda sounds like an afterthought. All the reader sees of this 
earlier love is a comically failed Werther-impersonation at a 
masked ball (3:97). Nevertheless, after the last shot on stage 
Roquairol actually dies, just as the narrator has assured us that, 
in his youth, he truly loved. The narrator leaves us hanging 
between the conviction that Roquairol’s performance is play 
and the knowledge that it is earnest: there is no vantage point 
from which we resolve the question.
By exchanging experience for fiction, Roquairol develops 
a strategy to master the reflexive structure of time that for 
Rousseau defeated self-possession. Roquairol’s focus on the 
future perfect of pre-packaged memories is a desperate attempt 
to control the openness of time through fictional play—in this 
sense akin to the fiction-making of Émile’s governor and of 
und finde eine Welt!]. For more on Roquairol within the context of the 
nineteenth-century reception of Werther, see Georg Jäger, Die Leiden des 
alten und jungen Werther (Munich: Hanser 1984), 175–76.
32  Armer Karl!—Du tatest noch mehr! Nicht bloß die Wahrheiten, auch die 
Empfindungen antizipierte er. Alle herrliche Zustände der Menschheit, alle 
Bewegungen, in welche die Liebe und die Freundschaft und die Natur das 
Herz erheben, alle diese durchging er früher in Gedichten als im Leben, 
früher als Schauspieler und Theaterdichter denn als Mensch ... daher, als 
sie endlich lebendig in seiner Brust erschienen, konnt‘ er besonnen sie 
ergreifen, regieren, ertöten und gut ausstopfen für die Eisgrube der künftigen 
Erinnerung. Die unglückliche Liebe für Linda de Romeiro, die ihn später 
vielleicht gestählet hätte, öffnete so früh alle Adern seines Herzens und 
badete es warm im eignen Blute.
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Rousseau himself in writing. Not long after his apostrophe to 
Roquairol, the narrator adds that his character looks towards 
death in his imagination, “always looking back towards his 
patron saint, death” (3:264).33 In taking death as his patron 
saint, Roquairol embraces the consequences of an emergence 
into the manifold of time as depicted by Rousseau in the wake 
of the emergence of imagination.
The narrator describes Roquairol as an artist whose theatrical 
representations of experience, anticipating experience itself, drain 
him: “every representation hollowed him out even more, as when 
hollows remain in the sun once it has discharged worlds” (3:263).34 
The performative anticipation of death is thus not the only motif 
linking Albano’s wild friend to Gustav’s gentle tutor. Gustav’s 
resurrection climaxes when he sees the sun for the first time and 
exclaims, “God is standing there!” (1:61), literalizing a metaphor 
familiar to anyone raised within the western philosophical 
and religious tradition.35 The Platonic motif of the sun whose 
appearance thus serves as a climax to Gustav’s education in 
inwardness makes a strange return in the culminating image of 
Roquairol’s inwardness. Roquairol’s the atrical representations of 
interiority empty him out so that he is as hollow as the sun might 
appear after the discovery of sun spots.36 
While interiority still defines the interpretive horizon of the 
metaphor, the connotations of this interiority have shifted rad-
ical ly. From Plato’s philosophy to twentieth-century physics, 
the sun organizes the life-world from without, imposing a limit 
33 Und immer nach seinem Schutzheiligen umblickend, nach dem Tode.
34  Jede Darstellung höhlte ihn tiefer aus, wie der Sonne von ausgeworfenen 
Welten die Gruben blieben.
35 Gott steht dort!
36  Though this is not the current scientific interpretation of the phenomenon 
of sun spots first widely publicized by Galileo and Christoph Scheiner in 
1612, it registers the surprise that European culture felt on first hearing of 
the changeability of the sun, whose presumed permanence had ensconced it 
in its traditional symbolic position. See “Scheiner, Christoph,” Encyclopedia 
of the Scientific Revolution, ed. W. Applebaum (New York: Garland, 2000), 
588. See also Rivka Feldhay, “Religion,” in The Cambridge History of Science, 
ed. K. Park and L. Daston, vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 727–55. Feldhay finds in Galileo’s first publication on sun spots 
“a philosophical broadside against the possibility of knowing ‘essences’ of 
things, thus destroying the traditional bridges between the senses and the 
intellect, between God and nature, and between natural knowledge and 
religion” (744).
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to change and relation in both the physical and intelligible 
realms of experience. The sun defines the internal system of 
life as a life-giving outside.37 Here, however, the sun does not 
appear as the necessary obverse of an “inner life” and guarantor 
of its transcendent status, but rather as an image of hollowness. 
Not only does the sun with its spots enter the phenomenal 
world, but it also becomes subject to the endless mutability of 
literary metaphor.
The repetition of metaphors has multiple dimensions, and it 
suggests multiple ways of reading. While the suggestion that 
one of these dimensions is musical is worth lingering over,38 
since indeed repetition in different contexts stretches semantics 
enough to make room for musical pattern, we must remember 
that in the end metaphor cannot entirely escape semantics. 
Though metaphorical language can approximate music just as 
much as it can evoke the visible, language’s inability to become 
entirely either image or music leaves open a hermeneutic reading. 
Reading of the sun in the context of Roquairol, the reader swivels 
back to the scene of Gustav’s emergence and sees the sun there in 
a different light. Repetition is revision. Reading is as open-ended 
a process as is life in time.
For this open-endedness, Jean Paul has a more precise name: 
he calls it “elliptical.” After a suspiciously blissful scene in Titan, 
the narrator addresses readerly anxiety over the ability of literary 
representations to supplant lived realities. The reader presumably 
finds it unreasonable of the narrator to portray such blissful 
scenes as that of Albano’s first acquaintance with Liane, which 
has just been narrated. After all, since nothing in the reader’s 
present experience can correspond to such scenes, to experience 
them in reading is only to nourish impossible dreams:
37  The sun as an external ordering instance enabling the system of life to 
remain coherent has survived into twentieth-century physics: “Thus the 
‘unnatural’ evolutionary process demands, for the sake of ever ‘higher-
ordered’ and more differentiated life-forms, the continual ‘ordering hand’ of 
the sun (which emanates syntropy or negative entropy)” [So verlangt etwa 
der “unnatürliche” Evolutionsprozeß auf unserer Erde zu immer “höher 
geordneten,” höher differenzierten Lebewesen die stetige “ordnende Hand” 
der (Syntropie oder negative Entropie einstrahlenden) Sonne]. Hans Peter 
Dürr, Naturwissenschaft und Poesie, in Scheidewege (1992/3): 103.
38  See Julia Cloot, Geheime Texte: Jean Paul und die Musik (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2001), 227–30.
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But, you good people ... you who have your beloved in your heart but 
not on your breast, am I not painting all these images of bliss, like the 
Greeks, as if on the marble sarcophagi of your discarded dormant 
past? ... and you, younger or poorer one, whom time rather than the 
past first gave a future, won’t you tell me, I should have hid from you 
certain blessed images like relics, out of fear that you would venerate 
them, and won’t you add that without these phoenix-images you 
would have nourished easier wishes and achieved some of them?—
And how I have pained you all!—but myself as well, for how could it 
be any better with me than with you?
Thus you would conclude that, since you could never experience 
such beautiful days as those that glow afterward in memory or 
beforehand in hope: so you would demand to have your day without 
either, and as it is only on both poles of the elliptical cupola of time 
that one can make out music’s soft tones of the spheres, while in the 
middle of the present one hears nothing, so you would rather remain 
and listen in the middle; and as for past and future—which no man 
can experience, for they are only two different poetic modes of the 
heart, an Iliad and Odyssee, a lost and found Milton’s paradise—these 
you don’t want to hear at all, nestling deaf and blind into an animal 
present. (3:220–21)39
The excursus provides an explication of human consciousness in 
three distinct and yet linked conditions: inwardness, temporality 
and fictionality. The narrator anticipates the despair of the reader 
who bears the desired love-object “in his heart but not on his 
39  Aber, ihr guten Menschen ... die ihr die geliebten Wesen nur in und nicht 
an dem Herzen habt, bild‘ ich nicht alle diese Gemälde der Wonne, wie die 
Griechen, gleichsam an den Marmorsärgen euerer umgelegten schlafenden 
Vorzeit ab? ... Und du, jüngerer oder ärmerer Mensch, dem die Zeit statt der 
Vergangenheit erst eine Zukunft gab, wirst du mir nicht einmal sagen, ich 
hätte dir manche selige Gestalten wie heilige Leiber verbergen sollen aus 
Furcht, du würdest sie anbeten, und wirst du nicht dazusetzen, du hättest 
ohne diese Phönix-Bildnisse leichtere Wünsche genährt und manche 
erreicht?—Und wie wehe habe ich euch allen getan!—Aber mir auch; denn 
wie könnt‘ es mir besser ergehen als euch allen?—Euer Schluß wäre demnach 
dieser: Da ihr schöne Tage nie so schön erleben könnt, als sie nachher in der 
Erinnerung glänzen oder vorher in der Hoffnung: so verlangtet ihr lieber 
den Tag ohne beide; und da man nur an den beiden Polen des elliptischen 
Gewölbes der Zeit die leisen Sphärenlaute der Musik vernimmt, und in 
der Mitte der Gegenwart nichts: so wollt ihr lieber in der Mitte verharren 
und aufhorchen, Vergangenheit und Zukunft aber—die beide kein Mensch 
erleben kann, weil sie nur zwei verschiedene Dichtungsarten unseres Herzen 
sind, eine Ilias und Odyssee, ein verlornes und wiedergefundenes Miltons-
Paradies—wollt ihr gar nicht anhören und heranlassen, um nur taubblind in 
einer tierischen Gegenwart zu nisten.
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breast” (3:221).40 To the objection that the narrator’s literary 
grave-monuments suggest a promise of rebirth that can only 
be deceptive, the narrator initially replies with the assurance, 
unsurprising for the age of sensibility, that he shares the reader’s 
emotional predicament. This argument may be unpersuasive, but 
it leads into the metaphorical equation of the temporal, affective 
life with literature itself, which closes the excursus. 
 The following, more persuasive response concerns the nature 
of human time, captured here in the metaphor of the whis pering 
galleries. Present experience is empty, consciousness being 
comprised of the poles past and future, memory and hope—
which are themselves already poetic creations. While the present 
itself is deaf and blind, and other points under the ellipse are 
capable only of perceiving the myriad impressions of temporal 
consciousness as unorganized noise, through a focused reflection 
between the two poles of past and future, human life can seem 
as ineffably self-complete as music. The ellipse is significant not 
for breaking the circle but for generating it—continually anew. 
The narrative closure needed for human life not to collapse into 
a chaos of possibilities is nevertheless always preliminary. Like 
the search for origins, the search for closure is intrinsic to the 
project of consciousness—yet poetry enables us to see this 
project as not only preliminary but performative. Not only is 
final closure illusory, but the process of its construction always 
contains an element of fiction-making or performance, whether 
in art or in life.
The ellipse is thus a privileged figure in Jean Paul’s thought 
for the paradoxical reason that it alone is capable of delivering 
spherical closure, if only for a moment. The elliptical time 
of reading Jean Paul becomes sensible in the repetition of 
metaphors. Confronted with Roquairol as a bursting sun, one is 
forced to reconsider the sun in its earlier contexts, for instance 
in Gustav’s exit from the cave. Memory and anticipation are 
after all focal dimensions, not only of life experience, but also 
of the reading of a text.41 Conversely, the oscillation between 
40 Nur in, nicht an dem Herzen.
41  The hermeneutic character of both life and reading that Jean Paul 
foregrounds in his texts is thus more in line with the hermeneutics of 
Gadamer than with that of his contemporary Schleiermacher, for it is not 
until Gadamer that the import of anticipation in the reading of a text gains 
its full theoretical expression. 
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past and future in the plotting of experience makes the project 
of living in some sense fictional, a reliance on “poetic modes of 
the heart” (3:221). The literary text presents itself as a mirror for 
the temporal reflexivity of the reader, whose gaze is necessarily 
focused, not on the real present, but on the focal points of past 
and future that are themselves as fictional as an epic poem. 
Once readers emerge from the deaf present into “the elliptical 
cupola of time,” they need the organized reflection of narrative 
fiction to guide them.
The equation of temporal consciousness with the process of 
reading and writing fictions opens a window onto Jean Paul’s 
filiations with the complex notion of “romantic irony.” While 
recent criticism has emphasized Jean Paul’s critical distance from 
the Jena romantics and his establishment of the alternative figure 
of “humour,” one would be mistaken to deny that an ironic design 
informs Jean Paul’s novelistic reflection on the relation of fiction 
to something outside of it.42 In his Berlin Lectures on Fine Art 
and Literature (Vorlesungen über die schöne Literatur und Kunst) 
of 1801–4, August W. Schlegel reflects on poetry as “always a 
poetry of poetry” since language itself, which is the ground of 
poetry, is at the same time already a poetic mode. Schlegel puts 
“poetry” and “language” in the same relation in which temporal 
consciousness and fictional play stand in Jean Paul’s excursus to 
Titan.43 Soon after the Titan passage quoted above, Jean Paul 
warns his reader not to try to realize the fictional scenes he has 
just presented in their lived experience, “for whosoever tries to 
42  For a representative summary of this trend, see the conclusion of Pleasures of 
Abandonment (151–56), in which Fleming juxtaposes mirror-images in the 
writings of Goethe, the Jena romantics and Jean Paul in order to argue that 
self-reflexivity in Jean Paul’s writing is a parodic gesture. That self-reflective 
writing—in the sense of writing that reflects on writing—has more of a 
central role to play in Jean Paul’s fiction than can be covered by the notion 
of parody, is one of the arguments of this essay.
43  “Indeed one can say without a trace of exaggeration or paradox that all 
poetry is really poetry of poetry, for it assumes language as a prerequisite, 
whose invention is already due to the poetic faculty” [ Ja kann man ohne 
Übertreibung und Paradoxie sagen, daß eigentlich alle Poesie, Poesie der 
Poesie sey; denn sie setzt schon die Sprache voraus, deren Erfindung doch 
der poetischen Anlage angehört]. A.W. Schlegel, Vorlesungen über schöne 
Litteratur und Kunst (Heilbronn: Verlag von [den] Gebr[üdern], Henninger, 
1884), 262. See also the French translation and critical commentary in 
P. Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire (Paris: Éditions 
du Seuil, 1978), 349.
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carry poetic dreams over into waking life is even madder than the 
North American, who realizes his nightly dreams” (3:221).44 This 
qualification is in tension with the foregoing defence of fiction, 
grounded as it was in the characterization of experience’s main 
temporal dimensions—past and future—as “poetic modes of the 
heart” (3:221).
Though reality bears traces of its fictional construction, fiction 
and reality are still not the same—even for Roquairol, who 
insistently stages their union. Moreover, Roquairol’s temporal 
reflexivity, rhetorical emphasis on inwardness, and pleasure in 
verbal surfaces resemble the game in which the narrator and 
reader engage.45 When Roquairol explodes “like the sun giving 
out worlds” (3:277), his explosion joins the series of emergences 
linking him to Gustav in leaving his cave of instruction and even 
to the reader in his emergence from the blind nest of the present 
into the more open, elliptical space of a life in time. Though 
these emergences promise the possibility of transcending the 
enclosure of the moment without sacrificing interiority to any 
mere externalization, their promise comes marked with the 
indelible stamp of the fictional plots and rhetorical play in 
which it is embedded. Far from merely depicting fictionally the 
emergence of interiority into a material and historical world, 
Jean Paul suggests that this process can only be seen through 
the eye of fiction.
In the “billet to my friends” preceding the prologue to his 
novel The Life of Quintus Fixlein (Das Leben des Quintus Fixlein), 
written 1795–1800, Jean Paul presents another opposition 
between nesting and emergence into the open. Rather than 
opposing the enclosure of the present to the openness of 
temporal life, the narrator here presents a choice that pertains 
at once to two ways of relating to the world in action and also 
to two ways of contemplating the world as a totality: 
I could never report more than three ways to become, not happy, 
but happier. The first, which leads upward, is: to drive so far out over 
44  Denn wer die poetischen Träume ins Wachen tragen will, ist toller als der 
Nordamerikaner, der die nächtlichen realisiert. “North American” here means 
“shamanic Native American.”
45  For a discussion of Roquairol as a personification of the playfully deforma-
tive powers of metaphorical “wit,” see Helmut Pfotenhauer, “Roquairol: 
semiotische Verwerfungen einer Figur,” in Jean Paul-Jahrbuch 1998, 
(Mühlscher: Universitätsverlag Bayreuth, 1998), 9–32. 
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the cloud of life that the whole world with its wolfs’ dens, ossuaries 
and lightning rods seems to lie far beneath one’s feet, shrunken like 
a little kindergarten.—The second is, to fall directly down into the 
garden and make yourself so at home in a furrow there, that, when 
you look out of your warm lark’s nest, you also don’t see any wolf ’s 
dens, ossuaries and rods, but just ears of corn, of which each is a 
tree for the nesting bird and an umbrella and parasol.—The third 
and last—which I consider the hardest and cleverest—is to alternate 
between the first two. (4:10).46
The first two ways to approach happiness are two perspectives on 
the world, one synthetic and totalizing and the other embedded, 
seeing only the most immediate surroundings. Though the two 
vantage points are distinctly placed along a vertical axis, they 
can also be seen accurately in terms of an opposition between 
enclosure and openness. A person who nests sees the world 
closing in protectively, ignoring utterly the dangers lurking 
nearby, while for the person who soars these dangers appear 
minuscule and harmless.47 
Thus, neither perspective gives a full picture of the world, in 
spite of the encyclopaedic ambitions of the one and the claim 
to immediacy of the other. Hence the smartest and hardest way 
46  Ich konnte nie mehr als drei Wege, glücklicher (nicht glücklich) zu werden, 
auskundschaften. Der erste, der in die Höhe geht, ist: so weit über das 
Gewölke des Lebens hinauszudringen, daß man die ganze äußere Welt 
mit ihren Wolfsgruben, Beinhäusern und Gewitterableitungen von weitem 
unter seinen Füßen nur wie ein eingeschrumpftes Kindergärtchen liegen 
sieht.—Der zweite ist: gerade herabzufallen ins Gärtchen und da sich so 
einheimisch in eine Furche einzunisten, daß, wenn man aus seinem warmen 
Lerchennest heraussieht, man ebenfalls keine Wolfsgruben, Beinhäuser 
und Stangen, sondern nur Ähren erblickt, deren jede für den Nestvogel ein 
Baum und ein Sonnen—und Regenschirm ist.—Der dritte endlich—den 
ich für den schwersten und klügsten halte—ist der, mit den beiden andern 
zu wechseln.
47  Hendrik Birus has anticipated this analysis insofar as he too reads this passage 
in parallel with different narrative perspectives in Jean Paul’s narratives. Birus 
sees in the exchange of soaring and nesting perspectives an analogy to the 
oscillation between first-and third-person narrative stances characteristic of 
the novels preceding Titan. Birus uses this passage as a hinge in his argument 
comparing the “peripheral first-person” narrative style of the early novels and 
the narrative stance dominant in the preceding satires, marked by “panoramic” 
views of society and the invisibility of the narrator within the fictional world. 
See Birus, “Systematische Verschiebungen der Erzählperspektive in Jean 
Pauls früher Prosa,” in Frühe Formen mehrperspektivischen Erzählens von der 
Edda bis Flaubert: ein Problemaufriß, ed. A.P. Frank and Ulrich Mölk (Erich 
Schmidt Verlag: Berlin 1991), 82–96, esp. 88.
 409J e a n  P a u l  o n  t h e  I n n e r  L i f e
is to oscillate between the two.48 It is admittedly a difficult path 
not suited to all, and within two pages Jean Paul concludes a 
paragraph amplifying his description of the second way with the 
dictum, “The most necessary sermon that one could give to our 
century is that it should stay at home” (4:12).49 Yet a sermon for 
the turbulent close of the eighteenth century need not be the 
author’s last word to posterity. The “smartest” or “cleverest way” 
is that belonging to Jean Paul’s narrators, alternately soaring and 
nesting, opening and closing the world for the reader through 
the play of narrative and rhetorical perspectives. In the absence 
of a guardian like Émile’s governor to serve as “master of 
comparisons,” regulating his desires through the near-illusion 
of fiction, the reader turns instead to the fiction presented as 
such by the novelist. “Plus nous gagnons sur la jouissance, plus 
le bonheur s’ éloigne de nous” (3:142): while from Rousseau’s 
point of view Jean Paul’s oeuvre resembles the triumph of poetic 
jouissance over experiential bonheur, Jean Paul implies that in the 
oscillations of enclosure and emergence is the only happiness to 
be had, either in experience or in poetry. The aesthetic of the 
incommensurable evident in Jean Paul is among other things a 
response to Rousseau’s measured ideal of nature. 
Let us return to the Vorschule der Ästhetik, where Jean Paul 
describes the work of poetry in spatial terms: “Unlike reality, 
which disposes of its prosaic justice and spreads out its flowers 
in unending spaces and times, poetry must please in closed ones; 
poetry is the only peace-goddess of the earth and of the angels, 
who leads us, and if only for a matter of hours, out of prisons 
and onto stars; like Achilles’ lance, poetry must heal every wound 
that it stabs” (5:35).50 This description of poetry proceeds through 
48  This passage has often been seen in conjunction with the opposition in 
Jean Paul’s fictions between sublime Himmelsstürmer like the “Luftschiffer 
Giannozo” in the story of the same name, which consists of a diary left 
behind by the protagonist after his crash in a hot-air-balloon, and the 
schoolmaster Wutz, who stays at home and writes his own books because his 
poverty keeps him from entry into the public reading culture—an opposition 
in which the scales are tipped towards the latter type. For an example of this 
type of reading, see the summary of an otherwise illuminating analysis of the 
life of Wutz in Fleming, 64.
49  Die nötigste Predigt, die man unserm Jahrhundert halten kann, ist die, zu 
Hause zu bleiben.
50  Ungleich der Wirklichkeit, die ihre prosaische Gerechtigkeit und ihre 
Blumen in unendlichen Räumen und Zeiten austeilet, muß eben die Poesie 
in geschlossenen beglücken; sie ist die einzige Friedengöttin der Erde und 
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two metaphorical passages in opposite di rec tions. Though to 
pass from reality to poetry is to enter an enclosed space in which 
poetry can work its pleasurable transformation, poetry also leads 
us out of a prison to the stars.
To be sure, in terms of the argument that soon develops, 
the two metaphors belong to different contexts. As Jean Paul 
will soon explain, the enclosure refers to the composition of 
a literary artwork, the way that it compresses the dispersed 
reality of different times and places into the limited space of a 
book, while the second metaphor relates the liberating effect 
that literary art can have on its recipient. Nevertheless, this 
logical reconstruction does not reflect the reading process, 
which immediately registers these two passages as opposed. 
Metaphors possess a suasive power which in many cases outlives 
the discursive context in which they are embedded. In this 
case, we understand that poetry frees by enclosing. This paradox 
is striking in a synoptic reading—or at least the approximation 
of one—of Jean Paul’s oeuvre, largely because it appears through-
out, both in the content of the narratives and in the narration 
itself. In a sense felt almost immediately upon beginning a 
read ing of the novels, enclosure and emergence define Jean 
Paul’s narra tive practice. The impression of polarity in this char-
acterization of poetry is only deepened by the metaphor of 
Achilles’s lance, with which it concludes. Poetry heals wounds 
only after the manner of a mythical lance that has also inflicted 
them. Rather than being a recursive stra tegy to undo the 
wounds of consciousness, fiction uncovers the fictional aspects 
of ordinary consciousness and celebrates them.
The mobility of the metaphors of enclosure in this section of 
the Vorschule der Ästhetik becomes apparent in the next paragraph, 
when the metaphor of the prison comes to refer to authorial 
subjectivity, in which the poet is enjoined not to trap his reader: 
“After all,” he asks, “could there be anything more dangerous than 
a poet, if he encloses our reality entirely within his own, thus 
trapping us in a prison within a prison?” (3:35).51 Literature is an 
der Engel, der uns, und wär’ es nur auf Stunden, aus Kerkern auf Sterne 
führt; wie Achilles’ Lanze muß sie jede Wunde heilen, die sie sticht.
51  Gäbe es denn sonst etwas Gefährlicheres als einen Poeten, wenn dieser 
unsere Wirklichkeit noch vollends mit seiner und uns also mit einem 
eingekerkerten Kerker umschlösse?
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act of communication between two consciousnesses, and thereby 
a confrontation between two enclosures. Bringing these two 
enclosures into relation has one of two results: it either concludes 
in breaking apart both or it locks one within the other. The poet 
can free his reader from his subjective enclosure, through a 
comparison with his own; but this comparison can also succeed 
in trapping the reader even further. What might be a jail-break 
can just as easily become a mise-en-abîme. To achieve the former 
and avoid the latter is a matter of infinite delicacy, for which the 
Vorschule der Ästhetik does not provide a conceptual primer. 
If Jean Paul’s characters seem intent on proving Percy Bysshe 
Shelley’s suspicion, voiced in the conclusion of his poem The 
Sensitive Plant, that “death itself must be / Like all the rest, a 
mockery,”52 then their emergence into the questionable light 
of fiction may also be read as anticipating another insistence 
of Shelley’s, this time in the 1819 essay On Life : “our whole life 
is ... an education of error.”53 Poetry partakes of this error, 
furthers it, and reveals it.
Bilkent University
52  Percy B. Shelley, Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald Reiman and N. Freistat 
(New York: Norton, 2002), 295, conclusion, lines 128–29.
53 Shelley, 507.
